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Abstract. Until the ending of Communist rule in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the objective of compulsory purchase was the achievement of a socialist
society in which the ownership of the means of production, including land, was
to be collective rather than private. Compulsory purchase legislation and laws
on ownership were used to expropriate private property. After 1990 the newly
elected democratic governments changed the constitutions to permit and pro-
tect private ownership of land. However, compulsory purchase is essential in a
market economy to deal with certain aspects of market failure. These include
the need to facilitate the provision of collective goods, such as infrastructure
and utility networks, and regeneration where the state may need to disrupt a
prisoners’ dilemma situation. In spite of their commitment to the inviolability of
private property, the transitional economies have had to develop compulsory
purchase procedures and means of assessing compensation.
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The processes that have been developed
should, in principle, be fair, accountable and
open and be compatible with the
requirements of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The procedures are generally
plan-led with the plans having been
developed by democratically accountable
bodies. There is usually a separation between
the acquiring and confirming body so that
those affected can appeal against the terms
of the acquisition. However, there do seem
to be more limited opportunities to challenge
the fundamental basis of a compulsory
purchase order than is found in some Western
European countries. Normally acquisition is
by agreement so that the adversarial
approach found in common law countries is
not the norm. This places less significance
on how the compensation is computed as far
as the proprietor is concerned but not the
taxpayer. For some countries compensation
is based upon market values. Earlier in the
transition process official values were used.
In countries where public finances are under
pressure or there were weaknesses in the way
in which the state divested itself of its
property and civil society is weak, there is
the temptation to use administrative powers
to secure the transfer of property to the state
or to reduce the compensation that is paid.
Whilst International and European Valuation
Standards may have produced a degree of
consensus amongst professional valuers as
to how compensation should be determined,
the state is not always a party to this.
1. Introduction
Between 1988 and 1990 Communist
rule came to an end in Central and Eastern
Europe. The governments that took their
place had a different ideological perspective
on the private ownership of property. The
private ownership of the means of
production had previously been considered
by Communist governments to be one of the
hallmarks of capitalism. During the transition
from centrally planned to market economies
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe
amended their constitutions so as to permit
the private ownership of land and real estate
and to protect the peaceful enjoyment of
private property. For example, the
Constitution of the Russian Federation,
adopted in 1993, declared that private
property rights were protected by law and
should receive equal protection to state and
municipal rights. The term nationalisation no
longer appears in the Constitution, Civil
Code, or other codes and laws. Similarly,
Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Bulgaria, adopted in 1991, guaranteed the
inviolability of private property with
expropriation only being permitted if the
needs of the state or municipalities cannot
otherwise be met and after fair compensation
(Grover et al., 1999). Similar provisions exist
in article 13 of the Hungarian Constitution
(2003) and article 44 of the Romanian
Constitution (2003). Private ownership of the
means of production thus became lawful and
protected. Property was returned to private
ownership through privatisation and
restitution. No longer did the state and
collective bodies have a monopoly over the
ownership of such property. If the state
wished to make use of private property that
the owner was unwilling to sell, it therefore
needed to exercise powers of compulsory
purchase. It could no longer just order a
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change of use. Since private property rights
were now protected, land could not be
expropriated but, rather, fair compensation
had to be paid. By implication, since real
estate was now traded between willing
buyers and sellers, the state ought to pay as
compensation at least the price that a private
purchaser would be willing to pay.
The transition from centrally planned to
market economy involves the redirection of
the state’s powers of expropriation away from
the pursuit of an ideology that is opposed to
the legitimacy of the private ownership of the
means of towards using these powers to
intervene in cases of market failure.
Governments in market economies have
powers to expropriate private property in order
to manage property markets effectively in
situations of market failure and in the interests
of enhancing the welfare of their citizens. The
challenge for transitional economies has been
how to adapt systems of expropriation created
to achieve the very different objective of
destroying private property markets to the
achievement of these new aims.
It is argued that the transition in
compulsory purchase systems from centrally
planned to market economies involves two
challenges. One is the creation of procedures
to expropriate private property that ensure
that fundamental human rights – in
particular, the peaceful enjoyment of private
property – are not breached. Most of the
transitional countries in Central and Eastern
Europe have adopted the European
Convention on Human Rights. Article 1 of
Protocol 1 (Council of Europe 1952) states
that no-one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest,
subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the principles of international law.
The other challenge is to provide for
adequate compensation for those whose
property has to be expropriated so that they
are not made worse off by the process.
Clearly the two processes are linked as the
protection of human rights with respect to
property requires not just a fair procedure
for its expropriation but also adequate
compensation. The Hicks-Kaldor adaptation
of the Pareto welfare principle states that a
project can be said unambiguously to
increase welfare only where the gainers are
able to compensate the losers and still be
better off. Otherwise the gainers will have
enriched themselves at the expense of the
losers rather than society as a whole having
become better off.
Whilst it is not a difficult process to
create a fair system of compulsory purchase
procedures that, for example, provides for
legitimacy of the decision, transparency and
openness in the process, and the right of
victims to challenge the process and to
appeal against the decision, ensuring that fair
compensation is paid to the victims is a much
more difficult process since it requires a
sophisticated system for valuing losses.
Moreover, this has had to be created in
societies which have no recent history of
valuing private property and in which
valuation systems based on open market
values for use in a variety of circumstances
have had to be created from scratch.
2. The transition from expropriation
to compulsory purchase
The constitutional protections for private
property adopted after 1990 in the countries
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of Central and Eastern Europe are in marked
contrast to the Soviet era when private rights
over real estate were largely abolished. The
Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets in
1917 issued a decree on land which made
all land in the Soviet Union the property of
the State.  The 1936 Federal Constitution
placed an absolute prohibition on civil
transactions relating to land. These provided
the legal basis for the expropriation of private
property that took place under Communism.
The 1936 Soviet constitution was extended
to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Eastern
Poland after their annexation in 1940. It
became the inspiration for the constitutions
and legal structures put in place by the
Communist governments of Central and
Eastern Europe after they came to power
between 1946 and 1949. For example, the
Hungarian Constitution of 1949 was
modelled on the 1936 Soviet one.
Private ownership of land was mainly
restricted to small rural plots for personal
cultivation and some residential property
(Vondracek, 1975). The tenure rights that
existed permitted the tillage of the land and
the erection of buildings. State bodies had
rights of operational management. In
practice, there were significant variations
between Communist countries as some
governments pursued a policy of
collectivisation, whilst others redistributed
land from large estates to smallholders. For
example, the proportion of agricultural land
in individual tenure in 1990 was 77% in
Poland and 92% in Slovenia, but only 5% in
Slovakia and Latvia, 6% in Estonia and
Hungary, and 9% in Lithuania (Lerman,
1999). In 1985 only 15% of Bulgarian
housing was in state or municipal ownership
with most families purchasing their own
housing (Hoffman, Koleva, 1993).
Under the Soviet system, the right to use
land was allocated, and could be withdrawn,
by the state. Compulsory purchase as such
could not take place as private property rights
capable of being expropriated no longer
existed. Rather the state could withdraw,
resume, or reallocate occupancy or use
rights. The withdrawal of land occupancy
could result in losses for which
compensation was payable assessed by a
commission. However, compensation was
generally not paid by the state but by the
body to whom the land was transferred
(Vondracek, 1975). In other words, the
beneficiary directly compensated the loser
rather than the state compensating the loser
on behalf of society. Losses that could be
compensated included the value of
expropriated buildings and crops, the costs
of reinstatement at another location, the costs
of tillage and improvement for which
revenue had not been received, and damage
to other buildings as a result of the
expropriation. Thus, the Soviet system
provided compensation for the loss of the
occupier’s immovable property, for
disturbance, and for injurious affection, but
not for the value of the land taken, since this
was already the property of the state. The
body from which the land was taken had
enjoyed occupancy, but not ownership,
rights and the compensation related to these.
The rules for valuing compensation were
generally based upon depreciated
replacement cost rather than the worth to the
injured party. Thus compensation was based
upon the labour embodied in the immovable
and working capital lost rather than its
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exchange value. Generally, physical losses
were compensated but “there is very small
room for compensation for worsening of land
values owing to acts of public policy”
(Vondracek, 1975, p. 238). Until the
Kosygin reforms of 1965 (Dyker, 1992),
which introduced the notion of profit as an
incentive for enterprises, there was debate
as to whether the losses that could be
compensated were the diminution of
property or the diminution of the interest in
the property. The latter contained the
implication that losses of unearned income
could be compensated. Households, whose
residences were taken, would generally be
re-housed. However, this could be in
accommodation that satisfied local space
norms even though it was inferior to the
property taken. The system may have
operated in a manner that compensated the
occupier for losses that were equal to what a
representative occupier might have
experienced, but could be less than the losses
actually incurred.
Compulsory purchase violates one of the
central tenets of a market economy, namely
that transactions take place between a willing
buyer and a willing seller so that each
believes he will be better off, in his own
estimation, as a result of the trade. The
compulsory nature of the transaction means
that one party does not believe that he will
be better off otherwise the sale would have
been voluntary. However, governments in
market economies need powers to
expropriate private property under certain
circumstances. Infrastructure projects, that
benefit society as a whole, could be
prevented by the opposition of a few
landowners who happen to possess
individual parcels along their proposed route
unless the state (or private body approved
by the state) has the power to acquire
compulsorily. Similarly, the state needs the
power to prevent the last individual owners,
who hold out in such a situation, from
commanding a monopoly price for their land
– in effect holding society to ransom – in
return for not blocking the project.
Urban regeneration may require
government intervention because of a
prisoners’ dilemma effect in which
individuals may be obliged to act in ways
which are not in their own best interests, but
which offer the only rational response to a
situation in which co-operation with other
landowners is not possible (Rothenberg,
1967). This can arise because part of the
value of any property is determined by the
neighbourhood in which it is located. A
property produces externalities or spill-over
effects on other properties. The rational
response in such a situation is to minimise
maintenance so as to maximize the benefits
from the externalities generated by
neighbouring properties, whilst contributing
the least external benefits to them. Such
behaviour can result in the creation of slums
if all property owners behave in this way,
since all the properties in an area will
become run down as each owner seeks to
maintain his property at a level that is below
the average. However, the cycle can be
broken by government intervention to
assemble sites for regeneration and to pump-
prime private investment. Essentially,
governments in market economies require
powers of compulsory purchase to respond
to certain situations in which there is market
failure.
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3. The development of compulsory
purchase powers
The development of compulsory
purchase powers in Romania during the
transition period provides a typical
illustration of the process. Law no. 33/1994
permitted compulsory purchase for reasons
of public utility after fair compensation and
following a court order. Public utility can be
for national or local reasons. The law set out
both a test to be met to justify the use of
compulsory purchase and a process that
sought to achieve a fair outcome. Impartial
adjudication should come through the
courts. Acquisition can be by government-
appointed bodies, where it is in the national
interest, and by counties, municipalities,
towns, and communes, where it is in the local
interest. Utility companies and public works
concessions, such as providers of roads, do
not have powers of compulsory purchase and
so cannot pursue infrastructure develop-
ments that require these independently of the
state or county authorities. A similar situation
exists in Hungary. The state and local
municipalities are entitled to acquire property
by compulsory purchase under Law no. 24/
1976, with other bodies that may need to
make use of compulsory purchase having
to justify that this is in the public interest as
set out in the Law no. 4§/1, for example for
town planning purposes, and work in
conjunction with the State or a municipality.
Similarly Article 17 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Bulgaria provides the legal
basis for the state and municipalities to
acquire private properties in order to satisfy
public needs. This was given effect through
article 101 of the Ownership Act 1951
(amended 1996). This Act formerly provided
the basis in law for the expropriation of
private property during the Communist era,
and some of these powers remained in the
amended form. Under Bulgarian law, as in
other countries in the region, the property of
the state and municipalities can be public or
private property. Compulsory purchase is
permitted under the Territorial, Urban and
Rural Development Act only if the outcome
is to increase the amount of public property.
These are principally for the construction of
public utility networks, the provision of green
belts and open areas, schools, hospitals and
public buildings, and the construction of
social housing. The transitional economies
thus developed a philosophy of when the use
of powers of compulsory purchase is
justified and processes by which it could be
achieved.
The development of compulsory
purchase powers did not always proceed
smoothly. In Russia problems arose with
compulsory purchase in the 1990s because
different elements of the legal infrastructure
were changed at different times. This
resulted in incompatibilities which were not
resolved until the new Land Code was
adopted in 2001. The first part of the Civil
Code of the Russian Federation was adopted
in 1994, with Chapter 17, containing articles
concerned with compulsory purchase and
compensation. Between 1994 and 2001 the
adoption of a new Land Code was delayed
by opposition in the Duma to the replacement
of the Soviet Land Code, which was based
upon the socialist principle of public
landownership.  During this period the
official land code remained the old land code
of the Russian Federation Soviet Socialist
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Republic, though it was subjected to a
number of corrections and alterations made
by Presidential Decree or Order. These
included Presidential Order N2287 of 1993
that provided for compensation for the
proprietor and user in the event of
compulsory purchase. A confused situation
therefore existed in which the Civil Code,
that was intended to put compulsory
purchase on to a basis more appropriate to a
market economy, had been agreed, but could
not come into effect until the new Land Code
had been adopted.
In Russia the state, federal objects and
municipalities are permitted to appropriate
land by means of purchase only in
exceptional situations to satisfy important
state and municipal interests, unless land is
not being used for the established purpose
or where there have been legal violations.
Article N238 of the Civil Code also allows
compulsory purchase where property cannot
belong in law to a person or where land has
been used for an inappropriate use. For
example, the Land Code prohibits foreign
physical and juridical persons from owning
agricultural land. If they acquire such
property, say by inheritance or as a result of
trading, they must dispose of it or a state or
municipal body will organise its compulsory
sale. Compulsory purchase involves the state
or municipality auctioning the property with
the proprietor receiving the proceeds less
administrative costs. Where private owners
come into possession that is restricted from
private ownership, such as streets and
ecological, cultural and historical sites, they
must sell them to the appropriate state or
municipal body. Whilst the Land Code
forbids the privatisation of such objects, for
example article 85 prohibits the privatisations
of streets, this may have happened in the past
when privatisations were less well organised.
The Land Code was not adopted until after
the main period of privatisation.
Where there have been legal violations,
appropriation other than by purchase can
take place, including confiscation on Court
order. During the period of rapid
privatisation, proper procedures may not
have been precisely followed so the scope
for pursuing appropriation following legal
violations may be more widespread than at
first sight appears. In such cases
compensation is payable for expenditure
undertaken by the proprietor but not for the
loss of market value. Nationalisation may no
longer be part of the Russian constitution or
legal code, but acting on past infringements
is a way of transferring real estate to the state
or municipality. In the absence of the means
of making acquisitions compulsorily, the
search for legal violations may be an
important aspect of compulsory purchase.
Past violations of privatisation procedures
and more recent breaches of license terms,
or tax or environmental laws may result in
title being less secure than it might appear.
In particular, recent violations of environ-
mental regulations and license agreements
have led to alterations in the ownership in
oil extracting companies in Eastern Siberia
and Sakhalin. There are constraints on the
expropriation of residential property in these
cases because of protections of human rights.
Poor systems of monitoring real estate may
also limit the use of these powers.
During the transition process the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
re-orientated their systems of compulsory
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purchase so that they enable governments
to fulfil the functions in a market economy
of tackling market failure and away from the
socialist objective of securing public
ownership of the means of production. They
have sought to do so in ways which protect
private property and which satisfy the
European Convention of Human Rights. In
doing so, it could be argued that they have
provided powers of compulsory purchase that
are more limited than can be found in some
market economies, both in terms of the
purposes for which compulsory purchase can
be used and the range of bodies that can
make use of them. An emphasis is placed
upon purchase by agreement as is often to
be found in countries with codified systems
of law (Dowdy, Jackson, McCafferty, 1998)
rather the more adversarial approach found
in common law countries like the UK.
4. The development of compulsory
purchase processes
It could be argued that for compulsory
purchase to be fair, the process should be
transparent and open. Owners and occupiers
of property ought to be informed at early
stage about proposals that may affect their
property. For the process to be a participatory
one, they and other interested parties should
have the opportunity to make representations
about and objections to the proposal. The
decision to proceed with the project should
not be made by the body that proposes it. In
other words there ought to be a separation
between the acquiring authority and the
confirming one as the former clearly has a
vested interest in the outcome and cannot
be seen to have acted fairly or in a
disinterested fashion. Interested parties
should be able to appeal to an independent
body other than the acquiring authority. This
helps to make the acquiring body
accountable for its actions.
In Romania, as compulsory purchase
can only be pursued in support of the public
interest, a preliminary study is conducted to
determine whether such a declaration can be
made. The work must be approved and
registered in the town plans of the area where
it is to be undertaken. The document
declaring that the proposal is in the public
interest is publicised through a notice at the
local council headquarters, in the Official
Journal of Romania, and in local newspapers
unless the work relates to national security.
The natural and legal persons who hold real
property rights must be notified within 15
days of publication. They may file objections
to the mayor of the municipality where the
property is located within 45 days from the
receipt of the notification, who must register
the objections and compensation claims. A
commission set up by the government or a
delegation of the county council has 30 days
in which to resolve objections. The acquiring
authority and owners of real property rights
can appeal its decisions to the Court of
Appeal. The Court verifies that legal
conditions have been met and can set the
amount of compensation where the parties
cannot agree this. In essence, interested
parties can mount a legal challenge to the
declaration that the work is in the public
interest but there is no public inquiry into
this at which interested parties can be
represented.  However, the expectation is that
the purchase will be by agreement with the
Court of Appeal acting as the arbitrator if
11
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the acquiring authority and property owners
cannot agree terms or compensation.
Hungary also requires acquiring
authorities to inform owners and all other
persons who can suffer from compulsory
purchase, such as occupiers, tenants, and
users of compulsory purchase proposals. This
is done by the public administration office,
the county or Budapest according to the
location of the property. Affected parties may
request the legal revision of the decision and
the proposed compensation. In the court
hearing into this, property owners have the
right to present evidence. As in Romania,
owners and other interested parties can
challenge the decision to acquire and the
proposed compensation, but they do not have
the ability to make representations about or
to challenge the basis of the proposal.
In Bulgaria the process of compulsory
purchase is also plan-led. An urban
development plan showing that the property
is assigned for meeting public needs provides
justification for compulsory purchase.  A
state body makes a proposal to the Ministry
of Finance and Ministry of Regional
Development and Public Works, with the
Regional Governor giving his opinion on the
request. If the proposal is accepted, the
Regional Governor sends a notice to treat to
the owner. Owners have one month in which
to object in writing to the Regional
Governor. If agreement cannot be reached
with the owner, then a compulsory purchase
order is made, which sets out the public
purpose being served by compulsory
acquisition, the description of the property,
and the compensation to be paid. Owners
have one month in which to appeal against
the order. The court of appeal adjudicates
on the lawfulness of the order and the
acceptability of the compensation terms. The
procedures used by municipalities for
compulsory acquisition are similar. A
majority of council members must approve
the proposal, which must bring into effect
an urban development plan. The mayor
informs the owners of property. If agreement
to purchase the property is not obtained, the
municipal council takes a decision to acquire
it compulsorily.
In Russia the reasons for compulsory
purchase appear in article N49 of the Land
Code and include meeting international
obligations and the need for real estate for
energy, utilities, defence, transport and
cosmonautical purposes. This includes the
provision of energy, utility and transport
networks. The decision requires the federal,
regional or municipal body to approve
regulations and the process is accompanied
by public discussion. The owner of the plot
must be informed in writing at least one year
before the compulsory acquisition. The
decision must be entered in the land register
and the owner notified of this. If earlier entry
into the property is required, this can be
achieved only with the agreement of the
owner. The owner can challenge the decision
to acquire compulsorily through the courts.
If agreement cannot be reached about price
or conditions of acquisition, the acquiring
body can send the redemption suit to Court,
but this must be within two years of sending
the first notice to the owner.
The systems of compulsory purchase in
the transitional economies have a number of
similar features. Owners of property have the
right to object to the acquisition, the terms,
and the proposed compensation. Appeal can
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be made to the courts which can set the terms
of the acquisition and compensation.
However, implicit in the processes is the
expectation that the acquisition will normally
be by agreement. Therefore the acquisition is
compulsory in the sense that it takes place at
a time determined by the acquiring authority
rather than at the choice of the owner.
By contrast, the British system tends to
assume that the acquiring authority and
property owners will not reach agreement.
Rather, the process will be an adversarial one
in which the acquiring authority will have to
seize the property and impose compensation
on the affected parties. This may be related
to the notion that those whose property is
being acquired are generally only entitled to
compensation for their loss based upon the
market value of the property. Households
and small businesses can benefit from
additional compensation, in effect, as
recompense for the acquisition being
compulsory, but the norm has been for
compensation to be only based on the market
price. Therefore owners are likely to be
entitled to compensation which is below the
price at which they would become a willing
seller. The compensation will be at the
exchange value of the property, but is likely
to be less than the worth placed upon it by
the owner. The emphasis on acquisition by
agreement in Central and Eastern Europe
could mean that the compensation is closer
to the owner’s perception of the worth of the
property, particularly if the compensation
takes the form of an alternative property,
such as another residential apartment, which
may be superior to the one being
surrendered. It is perhaps not surprising in
these circumstances that more emphasis is
placed in Britain upon the right to object to
the proposal in principal and not just to the
terms and conditions of the acquisition.
The British system allows interested and
affected parties to challenge the basis of the
proposal and not just the proposed terms for
acquisition of the property and compensation
to be paid. Objectors can include those who
object fundamentally to the scheme, such as
environmental campaigners objecting to why
a road or an airport should be built at all, as
well those, like community groups, who may
accept the need for the scheme but object to
its location. Environmental groups frequently
use inquiries to challenge the assumptions
that lie behind proposals, such as the
estimates of traffic growth used to support a
road building proposal and to express views
such as that higher taxation of petrol would
eliminate the need for the road! Normally a
public inquiry under an inspector appointed
by the minister will be held to hear the
objections and objectors can make
representations in writing or in person and
can be legally represented (for further details
of the procedures see Denyer-Green, 2005).
The process is therefore a quasi-judicial one.
The minister as the confirming authority is
informed by the inquiry in making his
decision and can modify the order rather than
accepting or rejecting it. The inquiry and the
ministerial decision can be challenged in the
courts. In such an adversarial system, the
participative nature of the process may not
be surprising. How far objectors can really
challenge the proposals is open to question
as they generally have fewer resources than
the acquiring authority. Nonetheless, the
inquiry system provides a way in which the
basis of a proposal can be kept in the political
13
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arena. Compulsory purchase should not be
seen as just a technical issue but is concerned
with fundamental values and the balancing
of competing interests. It is an issue of
governance. The British system includes a
number of safeguards for affected parties that
gives the impression that it is a more
transparent, open and participative one than
those in the transitional economies of Central
and Eastern Europe. This may also be
because of its adversarial nature and the use
of exchange values. It may also reflect the
historical legacy that compulsory purchase
is an illegal act at common law (Plimmer,
2007) that has been permitted by Parliament
only in certain limited situations. Allowing
challenges to the fundamentals assumptions
behind a compulsory purchase proposal does
not seem to be a part of the processes adopted
in Central and Eastern Europe. Whilst this
may reflect the more adversarial nature of
compulsory purchase in Britain, it could also
be the result of differences in the desire to
hold the government accountable for its
decisions and the willingness of the
government to be transparent and open in
its decision making processes.
5. Reverse compulsory purchase
The state and municipalities can make
decisions that have adverse impacts upon
property owners. For example, the
withdrawal of consent or implied consent to
undertake a development can reduce the
market value of a property. The publication
of plans for future development, such as the
line of a high speed railway link, can make
it impossible to sell properties in the
meantime even though eventually
compulsory purchase will take place. Thus
owners may be forced to hold on to properties
that they need to sell, for example, due to
relocation for employment reasons or
inheritance, until the compulsory purchase
order is eventually made. This could be years
after the original publication of the plans. An
important question is whether in these
circumstances owners can compel public
bodies to acquire their properties ahead of
when they wish to and at the market value
prior to the announcement of the plan rather
than the value after the announcement.
In the UK proprietors can enforce
compulsory purchase where a town planning
decision, including a listing a building as a
historic one, has made a property incapable
of beneficial use. Compensation can also be
claimed where changes in development
consents or implied consents cause losses of
value. Blight orders can be used to compel
purchase where the publication of plans has
blighted properties so that they can no longer
be sold or sold at the previous market value.
The threat of having to use precious capital
expenditure resources for these purposes
rather than directly to undertake capital works
for the direct benefit of its citizens makes
British municipalities wary of making
decisions, particularly in town planning, that
might force them to make such acquisitions.
These can be regarded as an important
safeguard against arbitrary changes to actual
or implied planning consents and premature
publication of plans that might blight an area,
though examples can also be found where
municipalities are unwilling to confront
businesses which have adverse effects on an
area for fear that these provisions will be
exercised.
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Russia also has a system of reverse
compulsory purchase where the actions of a
state or municipal body have resulted in it
being impossible to use a property. This
could happen if a site is to be used for public
access. However, deterioration in the market
value as a result of a decision does not of
itself give the proprietor the right to demand
the public acquisition of the property.
Situations in which the right is exercised are
rare. In Hungary owners can institute reverse
compulsory purchase when the value of a
property has been blighted by a proposed
development or if there is a change in town
planning consents. In Bulgaria, where a
development is due to take place in stages,
the Territorial, Urban and Rural
Development Act empowers an owner to
oblige the acquiring authority to purchase
all the properties at the first stage rather than
when the phases require.  The notion of a
reverse compulsory purchase by which
owners can enforce compensation from the
state or municipality does not appear to exist
in Bulgaria or Romania.
6. Compensation
In Romania Law no. 33/94 provides for
compensation to be payable for the value of
the property taken and any other losses
caused to the owner or any other party with
an interest in the property. Those entitled to
compensation are any who have an interest
in the property and not just those with
ownership rights, including use rights,
easements, and tenants. Those living in
residential properties, including tenants, must
be re-housed. The value of the property is
calculated using comparable evidence from
other sales. Other losses are compensated
according to the evidence submitted of the
damages suffered. The Court appoints an
Expert Commission to determine the
compensation with one expert being
appointed by the Court, one by the acquiring
authority, and one by the person whose
property is being acquired compulsorily.
Valuation is by professional valuers though
owners can appeal against these. The
acquiring authority is obliged to pay the fees
of the valuers and the court costs. A similar
situation with respect to compensation exists
in Hungary. The compensation is calculated
by the public administration office of the
county or Budapest and is based upon the
market value. Unlike the UK where
compulsory purchase is treated as a disposal
of an asset and is subject to capital gains tax,
in neither Romania nor Hungary is tax
payable on the compensation. The UK has
roll-over relief if the compensation is invested
in replacement property.
Compulsory purchase can result in losses
in addition to the land taken. There may be
disturbance if a household or business has
to be relocated. In both Hungary and
Romania such losses are compensated so that
the owner is not made worse off as a result
of the compulsory acquisition. Losses can
include loss of profits, relocation costs, and
losses such as unharvested crops. If a
business has to be closed as it cannot be
relocated, the losses that result can be
compensated. In Romania compensation as
a result of disturbance is not the result of
explicit laws but such compensation is
customary. There may be damage to
neighbouring property in addition to the land
taken or only part of the land maybe taken.
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In Romania there is no explicit statutory
basis for compensation but claims can be
made. Where part of the land is taken, the
claim can be made upon the difference
between the value of the property before and
after the expropriation. In Hungary
compensation is payable for damage to
neighbouring property based upon the
market value of the loss.
Compulsory purchase does not
necessarily bring losses for the owner. For
example, part of the land may be taken for
the building of a new road. This may make
development possible on the remainder that
would either previously have been
impossible or would not have been granted
town planning approval. In such
circumstances the owner might be made
better off even though he has lost part of his
land. Under these circumstances the question
arises as to whether any compensation ought
to be paid. In Britain there is a setting off
process designed to ensure that the owner
does not receive compensation as well as the
benefit from increased value of the
remaining property. In other words
compensation is only for losses so if there
are no losses only a symbolic payment is
made for the land taken so that a contract of
sale can exist. Hungary also has a process
by which compensation can be set off against
any increase in value of the remaining
property.
During the transition period, many of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
developed a valuation infrastructure that
makes compensation for the land taken using
market values feasible. There are trained
professional valuers who follow accepted
international valuation practice. In Romania,
ANEVAR, the National Association of
Romanian Valuers, undertakes the training
of valuers. The qualifications needed to enter
its training programmes are a degree or
higher education diploma in economics,
technology, law, or architecture. Members
must complete two years supervised practice
and prepare an individual valuation report.
About 300 persons each year obtain formal
qualifications as real estate expert valuer
from ANEVAR. There are approximately
6,500 ANEVAR members, of whom 2,800
are real estate valuers, and over 150 affiliated
firms. Members must follow the code of
conduct and can be disciplined for not doing
so. They are expected to follow International
Valuation Standards. In Hungary Magyar
Ingatlanszövetség, the Hungarian Real
Estate Association (MAISZ) was established
in 1991. It has 550 members, including 110
individuals and 330 valuation companies. In
2003 it created a certification body EUFIM,
which was accredited to EN ISO 17024 in
2005. MAISZ promotes technical standards
and enforces an ethical code. There tends to
be the use of European Valuation Standards
rather than International ones. A comparison
of the valuation methods used in Greece,
Hungary, Romania, and the UK as part of
the Leonardo da Vinci project RO/05/B/P/
PP175018 indicated that there are many
similarities in the methods employed by
valuers in the four countries. This is
unsurprising in view of the influence of
International and European Valuation
Standards and the globalisation of major
valuation firms.
This description of the current situation
with respect to compensation in Hungary and
Romania is not so very dissimilar to that
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found in the UK. The ten countries of Central
and Eastern Europe that joined the European
Union had to satisfy the condition that they
must have a functioning market economy.
Therefore to find compensation based upon
market values is not surprising. However, at
earlier stages in the transition period the
ability to generate market valuations was less
developed and such issues may still be
encountered. In Bulgaria the Local Taxes and
Fees Act 1997 (most recently modified in
2004) provides a methodology for the
determination of tax valuations, which could
be used for the computation of
compensation where owners and the
acquiring authority were unable to reach
agreement. The key variable is the normative
value per square metre modified by the type
of structure, the use to which the buildings
were put, the area in which the property was
located, and the external and internal
infrastructure. Values were depreciated
according to the age of the buildings, with
different rates for different types of structure.
The methodology used to determine the
normative values can be traced back at least
as far as the 1979 Regulation on Prices of
Real Estate and is concerned more with the
cost of real estate rather than its market
value.
It is one thing to have laws that provide
for adequate compensation; it is another for
this to be paid. Although in Russia
compensation includes the market value of
the land and real estate objects on it and the
loss of income from the business, the
calculation of compensation is complicated
by the legal situation with respect to property
rights and the process by which privatisation
has taken place. In Russia, as in Hungary
and Romania, there is a valuation
professional body, the Russian Society of
Appraisers, which has adopted the
International Valuation Standards. At issue
is not whether professional practice has
embraced the notion of compensation based
upon market values but whether the
government is willing to do so. The owner
of real estate objects, such as buildings, may
not be the owner of the land. The privatisation
process may have resulted in the real estate
objects being privatised together with
businesses whilst the land remained in public
ownership and was rented by the enterprise
on a long or short term basis. The authorities
can hinder the enfranchisement of the
freehold, which has an impact upon the
compensation. The rights of occupancy
being temporary have a limited value,
particularly if a high discount rate is applied
to the interest because of the risk.
The calculation of compensation is a
potential source of dispute between
proprietors and the state and municipal
bodies. Partly this is the result of there being
relatively few precedents and partly because
of the limited extent to which there is a well-
developed and efficient property market. The
values recorded in official documents, such
as technical inventorisation and taxation
ones, differ from the real market values by
orders of magnitude, sometimes more than
tenfold. Terms like “equivalent value” and
“fair compensation” are not clearly defined
or well understood. For example, should the
market value be that just prior to the
publication of the compulsory purchase
decision or just after, a particular issue as
values often rise on the publication of the
decision? The absence of a specific
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compulsory purchase law does not help.
The relationship between state bodies
and proprietors is not of equals. The state
has a number of ways of pursuing its
interests, including the use of town planning
and tax regulations, and these administrative
devices can be used to put pressure on the
proprietor. These can serve to minimize
expenditure by public bodies. The arbitration
court tends to favour state rather than private
interests. There are weaknesses in court
practice in observing the interests of physical
and juridical persons during compulsory
purchase. Independent valuers are not
accorded sufficient authority for their
valuations to be recognised by both sides in
disputes and, indeed, valuers may not operate
with objectivity in a way that is genuinely
independent of their client’s wishes. Similar
issues arise at the municipal level and these
are coupled with the more limited resources
of municipalities and regular deficits in
municipal budgets. Compensation is more a
matter of what is “possible” than what is
“equivalent”. Creating a culture based upon
equivalent value requires the development
of Russian civil society, but open discussion
of the issue promises advances in this
respect.
7. Conclusions
The countries of Central and Eastern
Europe have had to change their systems of
expropriation from pursuing the objective of
state or collective ownership of the means
of production to using powers of compulsory
purchase to tackle issues of market failure
in a market economy. They have had to
introduce compulsory purchase processes
that are equitable, accountable and open and
which satisfy the European Convention on
Human Rights, though when compared with
the UK there seems to be less potential for
objectors to challenge the fundamental basis
for a compulsory purchase order or the
assumptions that lie behind it. The
development of market-based compensation
was slower than that of the procedures. In
the late 1990s, as the Bulgarian system
shows, compensation was typically based
upon official norms. However, compensation
is now generally based on market values. In
common with other codified systems of law
emphasis is placed on acquisition by
agreement rather than the more adversarial
approach found in the UK. This could mean
that compensation is based upon the worth
of the property to the proprietor rather than
its exchange value. In Russia there are issues
about the determination and payment of
compensation but for Hungary and Romania
there has been a degree of convergence with
valuation practices in Western Europe. This
is probably a reflection of the impact
International and European Valuation
Standards. Whilst the valuation profession
throughout Europe has tended to accept
these, this is not necessarily true of
governments. Ultimately, compulsory
purchase valuations are statutorily-
determined and reflect the wishes of
governments. These may not coincide with
the consensus of professional opinion.
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